Abstract. There has been much interest in the neo-Foucauldian framework of governmentality as a way of understanding contemporary policy processes. In this paper I examine evidence from a case study of local sustainability indicators in the light of this framework. The role of indicators as a potential governmental technology is addressed, covering issues of their ability to objectify sustainability, the scope for altered subjectivities, their positioning within central^local government relations, and the construction and responsibilisation of communities, particularly in urban regeneration contexts. I conclude that the use of indicators at the community level may tell us more about central^local relations within contemporary governance than about the construction of subjects and objects to enable governance with regard to sustainable development.
Introduction
In this paper I use the framework of neo-Foucauldian governmentality to examine the role that a specific type of indicator plays. The focus is on sustainability indicators (SIs) and, in particular, on local sustainability indicators (LSIs) that have been developed through community-based initiatives. Using evidence from a London case study, I aim to understand the way that such indicators are involved in constructing the policy object of sustainability, actors' subjectivities, and categories such as`communities'. However, as will be shown, the case study suggests that the greatest insights come from seeing such indicators in terms of central^local relations within governance. Before presenting the case study analysis, I outline the governmentality framework and the understanding of indicators, particularly LSIs, as a governmental technology.
The governmentality framework Foucault defined governmentality in a 1978 lecture, seeing it in terms of a slow process of transformation of the state over half a millennium, in which the state was not a single entity but nonunified and heterogeneous (1991, pages 102^103). Government was not equivalent to a bounded public sector and indeed, given Foucault's historical frame, predated the creation of such a sector (Lemke, 2001, page 191) . Thus government was a problematic, concerned with the`conduct of conduct'.
As ever with Foucault, he takes the long view (Smart, 1985, page 130f ) , but his ideas have been taken up to examine contemporary governance, particularly through the influence of the work of Miller and Rose (1990; Rose and Miller, 1992) and Dean (1999) . From this neo-Foucauldian work a set of characteristics can be distilled for the governmentality framework, comprising: the notion of`controlling at a distance' through networks, the recasting of subjectivities, the definition of objects of government, the role of knowledge in rendering domains governable, the use of governmental technologies, and the importance of calculation in these processes. Each of these is briefly outlined next.
Indicators as a governmental technology? The lessons of community-based sustainability indicator projects
Acting or governing or controlling`at a distance' is the central concept of governmentality. It implies not that state authorities are seeking to control through direct and immediate force or other influence but rather that such control is achieved through broader systems or networks. The emphasis on networks is reminiscent of the political science governance literature that has made heavy use of network analysis. However, within such network analysis, the key elements are the links between the various actors and the way that resources are operationalised through those linkages (Rhodes, 1997) . The linkages are needed to overcome the gaps between the state and other actors. Distance between the state and other actors is taken as an a priori given and part of the problem that the state faces. Governance structures are established in order to overcome such distances through networks of various kinds. From a governmentality perspective, the aim is to enable control at a distance,``to create locales, entities and persons able to operate a regulated autonomy'' (Rose and Miller, 1992, page 173) . The networks do not bring actors together but allow them to operate autonomously. Indeed, governmentality requires the creation of distance in order that such government can proceed (Clegg et al, 2002, page 319; Schofield, 2002, page 676) . The trick within governmentality is that the creation of autonomy actually enables the goal of government to be achieved.
For this to work, the subjectivities of actors have to be altered so that they internalise these goals of government. The recasting of subjectivities allows government at a distance and is the way that the problem of how to achieve`conduct of conduct' is resolved. This is at the heart of the governmentality notion: the idea that, rather than the state directing others (principally its subjects and citizens) to do certain things, a complex set of apparatuses results in self-regulation among subjects and citizens to achieve the same ends (Rose and Miller, 1992, page 184) . As Raco puts it, the subjects of governance are actively created and mobilised (2003, page 76) . Identities are socially constructed and are an expression of power relations, so that governmentality is about recast subjectivities, involving the exercise of power in a decentred way (Murdoch, 1997) . As Foucault (2004, page 92) puts it,``Le pouvoir va si loin, il s'enfonce si profonde¨ment, it est ve¨hicule¨par un re¨seau capillaire si serre¨qu'on se demande ou© il n'y en aurait pas'' (``The power is so distant, it sinks in so profoundly, it is carried by a capillary network so tight that one asks oneself where it could not be.'') This is closely linked to the responsibilisation of actors, discussed further below.
Within governmentality, the emphasis on recasting subjectivities is paralleled with that on the construction of the objects of government. The focus of government needs to be defined, and the construction of this object is part of what binds actors into a network so that they can act on that object. This is more than just agenda setting though, since it involves making the object knowable. An object needs to be defined and rendered knowable before it can be recognised and acted on (Clegg et al, 2002, page 319) . Hence knowledge is implicated in the processes whereby the object of government becomes defined. Knowledge has to be accumulated to render the object not just an entity, but an entity that can be governed through decentred, self-regulating means. The Foucauldian view of knowledge as constructed and constructing, as diffuse and operating through capillaries of social networks, and as an integral aspect of power relations is invoked here. As Rose and Miller explain,``Governing a sphere requires that it can be represented, depicted in a way which both grasps its truth and re-presents it in a form in which it can enter the sphere of conscious political calculation' ' (1992, page 182) . Of particular interest has been the way that`communities' are constructed as both subjects and objects of government (Murdoch, 1997; Schofield, 2002) , and this is discussed further below.
To enable both the recasting of subjectivities and the construction of knowable objects of government, governmentality makes use of a mass of governmental technologies. These are``concrete devices for managing and directing reality'' (MacKinnon, 2000, page 296). They comprise strategies, techniques, and procedures, with a particular emphasis on the use of statistics, censuses, and technical studies. Murdoch describes them as serving``to translate government rationalities into routinized modes of action in spatially dispersed locales'' (2004, page 52, author's stress). Neo-Foucauldians argue that it is only through understanding the microlevel of the operation of these technologies that the processes of governmentality can be understood (Rose and Miller, 1992, page 183) . These technologies can be quite varied. Some of them will involve surveillance and monitoring of subjects (Appadurai, 2002) . Others will involve procedures that help define the objects of government (Murdoch, 2004) .
A key feature of technologies is the way that they involve techniques of calculation and standardisation (Murdoch, 2004) . Rose and Miller argue that``Making people write things down and count them ... is itself a kind of government of them, an incitement to individuals to construe their lives according to such norms'' (1992, page 187). Calculation thus assists in shaping subjectivities through the act of calculating. It also defines objects through the outputs of calculation. And the standardisation of such calculation processes spreads the influence of this dual construction of subject and object throughout networks.
SIs as a governmental technology
Within contemporary discourses of governance it is broadly accepted that the state can no longer direct actors to achieve specific outcomes but only steer them. There is a variety of mechanisms that can be used to effect such steering; indicators seem to be yet another means. As such, it is taken for granted within the normative governance discourse of policy actors that, first, indicators are a good idea and, second, they are effective policy tools. Most of the contemporary literature on indicators, particularly SIs, falls firmly within this frame. It emphasises best practice in the design of the individual indicators and the importance of fitting this design to the specific purpose of and audience for the indicators (Local Environment 1999). More recent work has sought to understand the significance of the specific context within which indicator sets are being used for assessing their potential effectiveness (Local Environment 2003; Pastille Consortium, 2002) .
Given the above outline of the governmentality framework, it should be apparent that indicators can be considered a potential governmentality technology and that insights may be gained from taking such a perspective. Indicators are a specific way of providing information, and Rose and Miller identify information as``itself a way of acting upon the real, a way of devising techniques for inscribing it in such a way as to make the domain in question susceptible to evaluation, calculation and intervention '' (1992, page 185) . Calculation is at the heart of indicators since their purpose is to provide a means of comparing performance over time or space. In so doing they define the object of their calculationöthat is, the performance being monitored. They make such performance the object of scrutiny and avowedly aim to influence behaviour through`naming and shaming' (that is, the publication of indicator trends) in order to`improve' performance. Indicators have a clear normative directionality through which`improved' performance is made apparent. In this way, the behaviour of actors is`controlled at a distance' and the objective of the indicator is potentially rendered governable through the expedient of providing knowledge about it.
The focus here is specifically on SIs. There has been a massive growth over the last decade or so in the development and use of SIs, understood as published measurements of aspects of sustainable development used to indicate trends over time and/or over space. Indicators sets can be found at all levels of policy activity from the international (IBRD and The World Bank, 2004) , through the European (Ambiente Italia, 2003) to the national (DEFRA, 2004) and, as will be shown, the local. This represents the interface of a continuing embedding of sustainable development as a legitimate focus of collective action and the increasing use of indicators across a range of policy areas. But how does the governmentality framework view such indicators of sustainability? Some strong claims have been made for the development of a form of ecogovernmentality. Goldman, through an ethnographic study of World Bank interventions in Laos, argues for a shift towards a situation in which``the modern eco-rational subject and the environmental state are being mutually constituted '' (2001, page 516) . He claims that the technologies of environmental reporting, assessment, and classification have constructed nature and people so as to render them manageable (pages 503^504) within the broader project of neoliberalism and the context of globalisation. In a similar vein, Watts argues for green governmentality, seeing ecological modernisation as a particular discursive form of broader patterns of governmentality in which`t he environment is rendered governable '' (2002, page 1316 ). Watt's brief intervention is functionalist in tone and suggests a need for the environment to be governed in this way for the sustainability of capitalism. A similar point is made by Baldwin, who draws a parallel between Foucault's focus on biopower and biopolitics in working on the social body to promote personal and population health, and`environmentality', in which``humanity [is] coaxed back from the edge of death (from nature) through the application and institutionalisation of new, eco-modernizing technologies' ' (2003, page 420) . He talks of``populations, bodies and natures'' being``disciplined by an institutionalised ecological modernity'' (page 420). This work suggests that sustainability could be a significant focus for governance through governmentality and, therefore, that SIs may be performing a particular role as an ecogovernmental technology.
Examining local and community-based SIs within a governmentality framework
The case study presented here looks at local, community-based SIs, where their development is contextualised in specific local relationships. This allows two other significant aspects of governmentality to be assessed, both of which relate to the issue of scale. One is the way that central^local relations between tiers of the state and within governance networks are implicated in a particular technology. The other concerns the construction of`community' as a governance subject.
Vincent-Jones has analysed the UK New Labour government's project of`responsibilisation' of local government and has suggested that the contemporary form of central^local relations implied by this lends itself to a governmentality perspective (2002) . In effect, the central controls the local but at a distance. But a number of other authors have drawn attention to the tensions inherent in central^local relations. MacKinnon writes of how some local institutional actors retain the scope to adapt and translate technologies emanating from the centre (2000), while Raco identifies local interests as resisting governmentalisation and instead developing their own agendas, techniques, and practices (2003, page 91) . Similarly, Murdoch suggests that there is a struggle between local variation and generalised application with regard to specific technologies (2004), a point echoed by Bulkeley in her study of the diffusion of Best Practice (2006) . This suggests that the study of local technologies of sustainability may be particularly revealing of tensions within the broader project of governmentality as studied at the national level.
The local perspective also allows consideration of the ways that the concept of community is enrolled into governance processes. Here there has been a particularly rich literature applying the governmentality framework to more traditional concerns of community, citizenship, and local action (Cherney, 2004; Herbert-Cheshire, 2003; Ilcan and Basok, 2004; Murdoch, 1997; Warburton and Smith, 2003) . Some of this literature specifically addresses the context of urban regeneration, which is pertinent to the case study discussed below (Raco and Imrie, 2000; Schofield, 2002) . Briefly, the issues raised concern the extent to which community is being constructed as a subject to carry the responsibilities of governmentality, whether this can be regarded as oppressive or empowering, and whether there is space for resistance as well as for compliance within such processes.
So LSIs are a potentially rich area for governmentality analysis on the basis of their construction as a technology, the insights they provide into rendering sustainable development a governable domain, and the scope they provide for examining governmentality at the local scale. Four questions will be posed in the context of the following local case study of LSIs. First, do the LSIs render the issue of sustainable development governable? Second, what evidence is there that LSIs construct local subjectivities? Third, how do they mediate central^local relations? And, fourth, what is their role in constructing community in the locality? Together the answers to these questions will enable an understanding of LSIs as a potential governmentality technology and, thereby, enable reflection on the governmental framework in the final section.
LSIs in the London Borough of Southwark: a focus on communities and regeneration
The London Borough of Southwark covers an area along the south bank of the river Thames running eastwards from the Tate Modern art gallery, Tower Bridge, and City Hall, and then southwards through Peckham to the leafy suburbs of Dulwich and Sydenham Hill. While it contains areas of burgeoning urban redevelopment (particularly along the Thames and in Peckham centre) and there are areas of middle-class affluence, there are also large estates of postwar council housing (often in poor physical condition) and considerable social deprivation across the borough. Southwark is the ninth most-deprived borough nationally, with more than half of all children living in poverty. A third of households are dependent on means-tested benefits.
Urban regeneration initiatives have, therefore, been a fairly constant theme of the borough council, even as it has changed political control (from Labour to Liberal Democrat). As a symbol of the council's commitment to a regeneration approach, the planning department is physically based in the Aylesbury regeneration area and is organisationally situated within a broader regeneration department. Two of the main foci of regeneration efforts have been the extensive council estates around Burgess Park and the mixed-use areas around the major transport hub of the Elephant and Castle, where the two LSI initiatives discussed below were based. As might be expected with initiatives based in regeneration areas, community involvement was a key feature. This reflects current trends within regeneration policy and, as will be emphasised, is a requirement of central government funding. However, there were also substantial bottom-up pressures for ensuring that local communities had an influence on policy in Southwark. The extensive council housing in the boroughö45 346 dwellings in 2004ömeant that many communities were tenants of the local authority and not always satisfied tenants. There was a history of vocal conflict between local communities in these regeneration areas and the council, leading to active demands for community involvement.
Sustainable development has been a developing`leitmotif ' of local council policy. The council began its preparation of Local Agenda 21 (LA21) in 1995, setting up an Environmental Development and Education Unit within its Regeneration Department. A Sustainable Southwark Partnership took on responsibility for LA21 work, producing an action plan in 1996 and a strategy in 2000 (Lucas et al, 2003) . The unit was disbanded shortly thereafter but an Environment Forum was set up in May 2003 under the Local Strategic Partnership ö the Southwark Alliance ö established in February 2002. The council adopted a Sustainability Policy in November 2004 and sustainability is cited as a value supporting the core vision of the Community Strategy for 2003^06. The promotion of sustainability has gone hand in hand with community engagement in Southwark. For example, in the council's strategy for`M aking Southwark Cleaner and Greener'', implementation is based on achieving sustainable practice and services and also on engaging the community``to achieve pride and resident responsibility'' (all strategies can be found on the council website at http://www.southwark.gov.uk).
Indicators have played their part in developing this community-based sustainability perspective. Two such LSI initiatives will now be outlined. One of these is an example of qualified success in developing LSIs; the other is an apparent failure. However, as will be shown, the failure tells us just as much as the success story about the nature of indicators as a governmental technology.
The first initiative was a community-based LSI project operating during 1998^2000 (see also Lingayah and Sommer, 2001; Sommer, 2000) . The LITMUS (Local Indicators Towards Monitoring Urban Sustainability) project was funded by LIFE monies (an EU environmental budget) and based in two regeneration areas: the Peckham Partnership and Aylesbury Plus areas. The project sought to engage the local communities in devising a suite of indicators that would define urban sustainability in their own terms. To this end, a team of four dedicated personnel was employed to educate the local community on the topic of sustainable development and to undertake a variety of activities such as mail shots, a street party, stalls at local events, and articles in local newsletters to raise the profile of urban sustainability within the local area. The team also sought to build capacity, within the communities, to develop indicators. In particular, it set up a series of workshops in which representatives of the communities came together to identify the main headings under which the LSIs would be defined. These workshops were essentially defining the policy priorities of the local communities (as represented by those at the workshops). The project team then worked up the actual indicators.
As shown in table 1, the list of indicators was quite diverse. Some of the indicators could use local government data; others required specific data collection. Some almost defied practical measurement (for example, indicator 18). But these indicators did represent a clear attempt at defining urban sustainability with community involvement. In order to achieve this outcome, the LITMUS team had to revise its terminology. While the LITMUS officers were all personally knowledgeable about and committed to the goal of sustainable development, they found that community involvement could be obtained only by reframing the issues in terms of`quality of life' and emphasising immediate and local concerns. A similar emphasis is noted elsewhere in the council's environmental policy approach, with a strong emphasis on the environment that`we' can experience. More global and ecological issues, therefore, tended to be underplayed.
Even with this reframing, community participation was not extensive. After some 1800 local people and 55 organisations were contacted, 40 individuals and 32 organisations were actively involved in the exercise, falling to 16 residents and 9 organisations after two months (Rydin and Sommer, 2000) . However, some of these were quite heavily involved, allowing for claims that this was building participation capacity within the community (Sommer, 2000) . After the development of the LSIs, further policy impact was limited. For many indicators, as table 1 shows, there was no systematic monitoring. There was a lack of local expertise for collecting some of these data; for example, for indicator 26, local people had to be trained to identify bird species. Lack of resources was also a key issue. Students were used for some time to collect data during fieldwork but, after a time, their efforts were diverted elsewhere. After the initial interest in the efforts of the project team, community involvement in the project declined. There was no long-term evidence that the definition of sustainability priorities was embedded in community practices or changed household behaviour (Rydin and Sommer, 2000) .
The other community-based LSI project was related to the regeneration of the Elephant and Castle area, supported by central government funding through the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) for the period 2000^06. This has enabled a range of local projects to take place such as a community warden scheme, a local information communication technology project, and a community advocacy and outreach programme. However, the main physical regeneration of the area is to be delivered through partnerships with a commercial developer, who will rebuild the commercial centre of the area, and a number of housing associations and private developers, who will deliver much of the new housing. Originally, private developers were asked to submit a master plan for the area for competitive evaluation. But negotiations with the preferred developer to emerge A partnership body, the Elephant Links Partnership (ELP), oversees the overall regeneration effort, with community involvement seen as a key element. At the start a Community Forum was established with direct funding from the SRB and a formal position within the partnership's organisational structure. This forum was tasked with developing a set of LSIs for monitoring the regeneration project according to community priorities. This was structured as an SRB-funded action research project managed and facilitated by a local university. The aim was that the LSIs would act as a community benchmark for the whole SRB project. This could potentially have provided an opportunity for challenging a view of sustainable regeneration based primarily on encouraging private sector investment into the area and bringing it within the remit of the central London property market .
In the event the work of the Community Forum was undermined by conflict with the council and divisions among different community representatives. Some were so suspicious of the whole regeneration effort and the local council's role in it that the Forum was effectively unable to function. There were concerns within the ELP over transparency concerning expenditure by the Community Forum and even the threat of legal proceedings. The forum was eventually disbanded and a consultancy now runs a virtual community exchange via the ELP website. The LSIs project itself was continually delayed; eventually a community-based consultancy began to draw up some indicators but this never reached fruition. The role of the local university was transformed into evaluation of the regeneration effort, reporting directly to the partnership body.
Analysing LSIs as a governmentality technology
Having briefly sketched out these two LSI projects, I analyse the role of LSIs as a governmental technology under the headings of the four questions set out above.
Rendering sustainable development governable?
The above case study illustrates the importance of measurement, standardisation, and calculation within the processes by which LSIs are developed. Much of the discussion with local actors in the LITMUS case was over how to render an aspect of local life as a statistic and then how to create a data series to monitor that aspect of life. Collectively, these measured aspects of local life constituted a de facto definition of sustainable development in the particular local context. However, it does not appear that the development of these indicators can be read directly into a broader dynamic of ecogovernmentality. Firstly, these indicators are doing much more than constituting nature as an object of government. They encompass a selective range of aspects of urban life, covering a mix of social, environmental, and economic concerns. They are not just about ensuring the longevity of ecosystems, as in more functionalist accounts of ecogovernmentality (Watts, 2002) , but about a mix of community-led and expert-led concerns over urban life and change.
Furthermore, each set of SIs measures and defines a particular version of sustainable development. Each set is actively promulgating its particular version; in this case a local version. At nonlocal levels there have been strenuous efforts made to achieve standardisation, in the UK via the national set of headline SIs. But, at the local level, the sustainability industry has led to a proliferation of LSI sets with consequent variation. The European Commission has sought to impose some kind of order on this local variation through its Common Indicators project (Ambiente Italia, 2003) . However, half of the ten indicators are optional, and buying into the whole project is entirely voluntary with relatively low levels of involvement to date (Ambiente Italia, 2003) .
Within London, a specific attempt has been made to develop London-wide SIs. The Greater London Authority has a statutory duty to pursue sustainable development and the current mayoral incumbent, Ken Livingstone, has used the sustainability trope as part of his electoral platform. As part of this emphasis on sustainable development, the mayor established a London Sustainable Development Commission (LSDC) in 2003. The LSDC placed particular importance on refining a sustainable development framework, based on thirteen principles, to act as a London definition of and benchmark for sustainable development. In 2004 it took this further by developing a suite of SIs (termed`quality-of-life' indicators) to support the framework. This comprises a core set of twenty indicators surrounded by a broader set of thirty five more (LSDC, 2004) . However, use of this set also remains voluntary and its existence does not preclude more local sets being developed. Rather, it is just one among a number of different indicator sets which are competing locally to define the construction of sustainable development.
This draws attention to the fact that there is actually a lack of standardisation with regard to sustainable development compared with the other forms of calculation that neo-Foucauldians emphasise, such as population statistics or, perhaps the most successful indicator of all time, GNP (gross national productöthe measure of traded economic activity, which is incidentally number 1 in the UK Headline SI set). What we are seeing in this lack of standardisation of SIs is not just a variety of constructions vying with each other but a process in which different actors are actively using different SIs to promote a particular perspective on sustainable development. There is considerable apparent social constructivist agency in the SI industry. This suggests that, from a governmentality perspective, SIs are a site for contested constructions of sustainable development and not a site for standardisation of this concept. They do not collectively render the domain of sustainable development knowable. Rather, they highlight its current ungovernability.
Perhaps this is an early stage of governmentality where sustainable development is concerned. There is little dynamic in most neo-Foucauldian analyses, with most analyses being post hoc and trying to rationalise what has happened in neo-Foucauldian terms. It could be the case that governmentality is not an established fact across all policy domains, but an emerging trend with varying rates of emergence in these different policy domains. What we are witnessing with SIs could be the kind of activity that occurs in the run-up to a hegemonic construction of sustainable development through these kinds of technologies. However, this is just a hypothesis based on the assumption that such a hegemonic position will and should eventually result (for discussion of hegemonic projects see MacKinnon, 2000, page 297). There are grounds to argue that sustainable development will never be objectified and tamed in the way suggested by governmentality. For sustainable development is an inherently composite rationality, constructed as a variety of combinations of other rationalities (Dryzek, 1997; Rydin, 2003) . SIs make this complexity apparent rather than standardising it away.
Altering actors' subjectivities
As emphasised above, rendering sustainable development governable it not just about standardising its measurement. It is also about altering the subjectivities of actors so as to enable self-government in relation to this objective. By definition, SIs construct an object (albeit it a contested one) but it is much more questionable whether SIs are actively shaping subjectivities. To understand this, a starting point is to examine how SIs might shape subjectivities. For SIs to be powerful in this way would require that their assumptions about governmental priorities would need to be become embedded in institutional arrangements and thereby in actors' self-reflexive views of their roles.
On this basis, institutional actors would then self-govern their behaviour in line with the prioritisation and rationalities inherent in the SI set. It would be assumed appropriate to follow the target set by a SI. While this might be the avowed claim of SIs, this is clearly an overstatement of the possible influence of SIs on their own. It is an appealing claim, particularly within environmentalist circles where there is much emphasis on the need to change individual behaviour to achieve sustainable development and a desire to inculcate green values more generally.
However, such indicators achieve their embedded status and the role in shaping subjectivities where they are attached to a resource dependency, at least in the early stages of the development of an indicator. GNP has been referred to above as a supremely successful indicator. But this is not just because a myth of economic rationality pervades our society. Certainly, economic rationality is a powerful societal myth but it is also tied into institutional arrangements whereby there is a positive material incentive for certain actors to try to improve performance on this indicator. There will be nonmaterial incentives, but the financial benefits for key actors who are driven by this target are also apparent.
Another issue is the extent to which subjectivities are actually altered by such indicators or whether there is a strategic instrumentality that follows from the use of indicators. In the case of GNP there is undoubtedly considerable internalisation occurring but strategic action even here can coexist with different values; many socialists still invest in private pension and investment plans. What is at issue here is the extent to which a general rationality, represented by a specific technology, has become culturally embedded. It is doubtful whether sustainable development has achieved this status. Indeed, it could be argued that it is unlikely to achieve this status because it lacks coherence, has no history of being successfully embedded in societal discourses, is not a carrier of power, and, indeed, implies conflicts with prevailing economic discourses.
Mediating central^local relations
The third question raised above concerns the role of SIs from the perspective of central^local relations, and it is here that the questions raised by the governmentality perspective seem most fruitful. The Elephant and Castle example, in particular, provides interesting material here. The relevant context is the prevailing governance culture of new public management whereby local municipalities are responsibilised (Vincent-Jones, 2002, page 38) . The mechanism or technology by which this is achieved is the extensive use of centrally determined performance indicators (Best Value indicators in contemporary New Labour government parlance) and the tying of measured performance to resource decisions and the exercise of discretionary sanctions. Good performance as measured by these means provides the opportunity for some limited release from central government scrutiny. Vincent-Jones terms this`r esponsibilised autonomy '' (2002, page 44) . This forms the backdrop to the urban regeneration effort at Elephant and Castle, under central government funding from the SRB (now defunct as a funding stream except for ongoing projects). The terms of the SRB required the local regeneration partnership to report regularly, initially to the Government Office for London (a central government regional office) and then to the London Development Agency (the regional development agency for London). Reporting was judged against a series of previously agreed performance indicators for the project. Included amongst these was the requirement to consult with the local community and to ensure that the regeneration effort was guided, at least in part, by community concerns. The Community Forum Action Research Project was an attempt to fulfil this requirement.
The LSI project could therefore be seen as implicated in the governmentality links between steering through central government policy and local government selfmanagement. It was not in itself, however, a technology of governmentality extending the links of self-government down to the community level. For the LSIs, if developed, were intended to monitor the Partnership Board and its regeneration activities; there was no self-monitoring among the community embedded within this potential LSI project. So the LSI initiative in this case was not so much an attempt to change the subjectivities of the community and to render sustainable development governable in the context of regeneration, as part of the process by which the regeneration project was being controlled at a distance by higher tier government (see also Raco and Imrie, 2000, page 2195) .
This form of control through central^local relations was centrally dependent on the flow of resources; it was an incentivised change in subjectivities of local government (see also MacKinnon, 2000, page 298) . The resistance of the community to comply in this initiative caused some difficulties but, as it was related only to one out of many other performance indicators, it did not jeopardise the project. Nevertheless, this case reinforces the findings of other literature concerning the potential for nonlocal technologies to be subverted through local agency. This discussion also suggests that any account of governance needs to have space for the nonfunctionality of central policy tools and for local variation and resistance. The language of the governmentality framework with its emphasis on power operating through technologies may tend towards interpretations that underemphasise these aspects.
Constructing the local community
The construction of local community itself is the fourth and final issue to be considered in this case study. Much of the governmentality literature that comments on community emphasises how responsibility is being devolved to citizens individually and to communities collectively through technologies which render them responsible for policy and shape their subjectivities accordingly. Raco and Imrie specifically state:`t he SRB requires the marginalised and the poor to act in order to render government effective '' (2000, page 2194) . These cases of LSI initiatives engage interestingly with this picture. The case study provides evidence of the LSI process itself seeking to cement the notion of community within a specific group by denoting the results of their deliberations as indicators owned by a community. In the case of both the LITMUS and ELP examples, a specific group was tasked with devising and legitimating the SIs through its involvement, even though there was also wider consultation in the case of LITMUS. There was, further, an attempt at some delegation of responsibility for the indicators in terms of continued maintenance of the SI sets, but this was resisted, either at the outset in the case of ELP or once the set was established in the case of LITMUS.
Resistance also characterised the framing of the SI exercise. In the ELP case, this was resistance to the whole exercise but in the LITMUS case it took the form of resisting the label of sustainable development. The LITMUS team understood this as a lack of understanding about sustainability. However, this can be understood as an attempt to refocus the exerciseöwhich was after all taking up not inconsiderable amounts of people's timeöin a direction that was more meaningful to them. Hence the emphasis on quality of life, with its focus on the everyday experience of residents, fears of crime, and evidence of private and public poverty. The LITMUS team accepted this redefinition but the more environmentally minded among the team felt this was a negative feature.
The governmentality literature suggests that communities are being empowered to enable self-government. However, it would be more appropriate to see this as an attempt to assert control over an area of council policy with a view to then handing responsibility for delivery back to the local state; members of the community did not see the definition of quality of life as a precursor for them taking responsibility and action themselves for delivering a better quality of life. However, the local authority did not accept this responsibility either, at least through the medium of the LSIs, and little action followed on the development of the LSI set. The one area of action that followed was the creation of a pack to be used in local schools with a view to creating interest in sustainability, a potential if rather symbolic responsibilisation of future citizens.
This suggests that LSIs can act as sites of community resistance rather than as arenas of community compliance and responsibilisation as suggested by the governmental technology frame [contra to Raco and Imrie's view of urban regeneration initiatives (2000, page 2195)]. And this resistance is not just about the focus of the indicators and the associated construction of sustainability. It is also about the value of the indicator tool itself; the technology becomes contested rather than acting as a medium for compliance. This reinforces the need to incorporate adequate accounts of agency in any discussion of local governance.
Reflecting on governmentality and LSIs
This case study allows some comment on the four aspects of governmentality identified above. It suggests that these community-based LSIs were not involved in rendering sustainability a governable object but rather their development highlighted the extent of competition, contestation, and constructivist agency around the composite goal of sustainable development. There was no evidence of this technology altering subjectivities, at least within the local communities. The targeted subjectivities appear to have been local government actors, since the indicators did play a role in the mediation of central^local relations over urban regeneration and urban management more generally. Specifically, the LSIs were enrolled in the monitoring of local government by central government. The responsibilisation of local government through the nature of central^local relations was an issue, but this could not be extended to the construction of communities as subjects of governmentality. Rather, communities appeared to resist such constructions and the associated responsibilisation. This suggests that any use of the governmentality framework needs to allow for greater agency and conflict in the construction of objects and subjects. It also suggests that central government technologies of control at a distance may dominate over the role of local government technologies with reference to their local communities.
Above all this case shows the importance of avoiding functional accounts of governance and recognising the importance of agency in all its forms. For MacKinnon this means attention to contestation and resistance (2000, page 299); for Vincent, it means an emphasis on motivation and meaning (2002, page 308) . Furthermore, governmental technologies themselves need to be seen as sites of agency. Ilcan and Basok draw attention to``their [communities'] diverse capacities to subvert and modify projects that aim to engage them in forms of government '' (2004, page 130) and HerbertCheshire emphasises the potential for``an active form of compliance'' rather than assuming that such compliance necessarily involves altered subjectivities (2003, page 461 ). Rose and Miller recognise that technologies may operate in unexpected ways because of agency (1992, page 190) . Any account of a potential technology needs to avoid reading governmentality into outcomes (Cherney, 2004) and assuming that a particular technology will deliver a particular rationality. Instead, it needs to pay attention to the actual engagement of actors with such technologies and to the contingency of particular cases, rather than assuming that the implication of adopting a particular policy tool is effective`conduct of conduct'. This means resisting ``the neo-Foucauldian tendency to over-emphasise the coherence and effectiveness of political projects'' (MacKinnon, 2000, page 309) and not assuming that``diverse arenas of practice connect automatically'' (Vincent, 2002, page 317) .
If this seems to constrain the analysis, loosening this link between technologies and subjectivities also opens up possibilities. In particular, it suggests a situation where policy rationalities differ in the extent to which they are embedded in everyday practice and, therefore, differ in their potential for conveying discursive power. Foucauldian analyses seem to work best where embedded discourses, such as neoliberal economic rationality, are being discussed. In more contested terrains, such as environmental rationality or the composite sustainability rationality, such embeddedness has not been achieved. It is actively being used to legitimate policy positions but in a context where conflict and contestation are expected; this is not the terrain of the`taken for granted'. In such a context, not all discourse necessarily constitutes power relations and not all calculations will fulfil the neo-Foucauldian conditions for a governmental technology. Rather, it is more appropriate to examine such contested situations in terms of the strategic use of discourse (Rydin, 2003, chapter 3; Schofield, 2002, page 668) and the identification of points of calculation by actors as a site for resistance and debate. As Vincent identifies, such points of resistance may coexist with an integrated hegemonic whole, with governmental technologies both being a focus of conflict and contributing to the drawing of mythic connections in a form of symbolic politics (2002, page 308) .
The possibility that aspects of government might play a symbolic role is not allowed for within a governmentality approach. Yet, this seems to be a realistic interpretation of what is happening with many SI initiatives. In various ways they contribute to the legitimisation of governmental action. They provide the appearance of taking policy action under the banner of sustainable development in the face of demands to be doing so. They fit with a procedural rationality that is an important part of convincing us of the value of public policy and of government itself (Rydin, 2003) . Engaging in initiatives such as SIs can therefore contribute to this legitimisation of government even where the SIs themselves are not a functioning element of governmentality. This is not an insignificant aspect of contemporary governance. Diversionary policy action is important because it diverts attention from other policy action and it consumes resources that might have been used elsewhere. It legitimates what might otherwise be unacceptable policy activity. This is a significant function for SIs and for other indicators quite separate from any role they do or do not play in changing subjectivities within the broader community and encouraging self-government by actors for particular ends. Following this argument, the rationality of SIs lies in their self-justification of purposeful, logical, and apparently effective governmental activity. To argue any more is, ironically, to take the rationality of SIs at face value by seeing such procedures and policy tools as necessarily encapsulating the power of governmentality.
